

Are Emigrants Less Pro-Social in Their New Community Than They Used To Be at Home?

A Comparative Analysis of Latvians At Home and Abroad

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Research question

- Migration has **increased rapidly** in Europe during the last 10 years.
- Several studies have looked at the effect of ethnic diversity on trust and participation, yet **the effect of migration on the activism of migrants themselves** are still unclear.
- Recent studies in Europe find a large gap between immigrants and natives in terms of education and employment (Huddleston et al. 2013).
- Research on participation shows that foreign-born individuals **participate at lower rates** than native-born ones (Just and Anderson 2012; Sandovici and Listhaug 2010; Aleksynska 2010, Eggert and Giugni 2010, Rooj 2012). Somewhat conflicting evidence as regards to associations.
- Could this gap be partly a **result of emigration?**

How emigration could decrease participation?

- Embeddedness in the local community and social connectedness plays an important role in conventional and unconventional participation (Klandermans and van den Toorn 2008; Sandovici and Listhaugh 2010).
- Immigrants are likely to be **less attached to their new community** and not identify to the same extent with the residents of this country (Goette et al., 2006; Simpson, 2006; Yamagishi and Mifune, 2008; Dawes and Messick 2010; Klandermans and van den Toorn 2008).

People who are socially well connected, tend to have a stake in the community and its political issues, and thus are more likely to participate in politics (Sandovici and Listhaugh 2010: 75). The mechanisms facilitating participation when “in country” lack force in the expatriate context. Changes in cross-border social structures may curb interest and involvement in home country politics (Waldinger and Soehl 2013: 443)

How emigration could decrease participation?

- Participation of immigrants might be obstructed by **social isolation, weaker social networks** and social connectedness that could act as a mobilising force and provide the necessary resources and information (Bilodeau 2008; Klandermans and van den Toorn 2008; Diani and McAdam 2003; Kitts 2000; Albarracin and Valeva 2011)
- They might have **insufficient understand the political issues** in their new country of residence or the channels of influence (Waldinger and Soehl 2013; Bowers 2004)

As politics are bounded, moving to the territory of a different state yields political detachment: diminishing awareness of home country political matters and weakened ties to the home states electoral institutions (Waldinger and Soehl 2013: 445)

How emigration could decrease participation?

- Thinking about a **stay abroad as temporary** might further diminish incentives to participate.
- Many immigrants are **not citizens** of the particular country which affects political participation far beyond simply voting (Just and Anderson 2012).
- Participation might be obstructed by **insufficient language skills** too (Eggert and Giugni 2010; Michalikova 2013; Stoll and Wong 2007).

How emigration could increase participation?

- Due to **grievances related to possible discrimination** we might expect migrants to be more involved in protest activities (Spaiser 2012; Klandermans and van den Toorn 2008; Albarracin and Valeva 2011; Just and Anderson 2012)
- **Relative deprivation** can result in more intense activism (Folger 1986; Klandermans and van den Toorn 2008).

How emigration could increase participation?

- Minority status and more **intense identification with own ethnic group** can be a spark for political participation (Sandovici and Listhaugh 2010)
- Weaker ties and **inability to rely on the support from family** can push people towards more active civic engagement and political participation (Alesina and Guiliano). In particular, **diaspora organisations** have a very important instrumental role (Barreto and Munoz 2003).

What do we know so far?

- To what extent the fact that emigrants are potentially less embedded in their new community and place of residence **affects their civic and political behavior** in the receiving country?
- In previous studies, when multiple regression analysis is used and the individual and contextual controls are taken into account, the differences between immigrants and natives **become rather small or disappear** (Leighley 2001; Norris et al. 2004; Rooj 2012).
- Comparing immigrants with natives (or stayers) is not be an ideal method to determine the effect of migration.
- No studies so far have addressed the effect of migration on civic and political participation.

Although European countries have long experienced significant migration, we know little about its consequences for countries patterns of civic life. (Just and Anderson

Aim of the paper

- *The aim of this paper* is to analyse the consequences of migration on civil society and civic activism,
- *Hypothesis:* Emigration causes a decrease in political and social activism such as:
 - H1 voting in parliamentary elections;
 - H2 participating in demonstrations, protests, strikes;
 - H3 signing petitions or writing letters to public officials;
 - H4 engaging in voluntary work;
 - H5 donating at the individual level;
 - H6 membership in organisations and associations.
 - H7 emigrants adjust to the participation culture of the host societies.

How to test that?

- The simplest thing to do would be to compare the civic and political involvement of those who have emigrated and those who have not. However...
 - Migrants differ not only by the fact that they have emigrated. There is a certain **selection effect**.
 - The observed correlation might be **spurious**. Migration and activism might be associated via certain confounders, e.g., education or income.
 - We have to take into account the problem of **causal inference** (Holland, 1986).
- How to obtain a credible estimate of the counterfactual, i.e., how active those who emigrated would be had they not emigrated?

Finding the 'treatment effect'

We are interested in the average effect of migration on those who emigrate (treatment effect on the treated) - ATT.

$$ATT = E(Y_1 - Y_0 | D = 1)$$

where $D=1$ refers to migration (treatment).

We can not observe what was the effect on those who emigrated, but we can compute:

$$\Delta = E(Y_1 | D = 1) - E(Y_0 | D = 0)$$

and assume that:

$$\Delta = ATT + SB$$

where SB is the selection bias.

The method of choice: PSM

- **Propensity score matching (PSM)** provides a means for adjusting for selection bias in observational studies of causal effects (Beal and Kupzyk 2014);
- As selection into ‘treatment’ (emigration) is not random, we must compare treated (migrants) and controls (those who have not emigrated) who are **similar in terms of everything** that affects the outcome; However, matching each confounder – especially if there are many and/or numeric variables – is not viable:
- PSM summarizes all of the background (covariate) information about treatment selection into a scalar - PS, i.e., the probability that an individual receives the treatment, given a set of observed variables; individuals can then be compared **on the basis of PS alone**.

Key assumptions of PSM

If the key assumptions of PSM:

- 1 Conditional independence

$$(Y_1, Y_0) \perp D | X$$

- 2 Common support

$$0 < P(D = 1 | X) < 1$$

are satisfied, we can behave as if individuals had been randomly assigned to a treatment, and we can claim that the observed **differences are due to treatment (emigration)** (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983).

Balancing confounders (covariates)

- There are **different methods** of matching one can use.
- However, the most important thing is to ensure that in the estimated PS the **covariates are adequately balanced** between the treated and control group individuals!
- Balancing tests pair up treated and control subjects with similar values of the propensity score, discarding all unmatched units, and making the results **more reliable**.

The data

In this paper I rely on two sources of data:

- For the control group: **“Public Goods through Private Eyes: Exploring Citizens’ Attitudes towards Public Goods and the State in East-Central Europe”**:
 - 1521 interviews in Latvia, age 15+, random stratified sample, face-to-face interviews in respondents’ homes, interviews conducted in early 2014.
- For the treatment group: **“The emigrant communities of Latvia: National identity, transnational relations, and diaspora politics”**:
 - 14 068 interviews of Latvian emigrants, age 15+, Web-survey using different sources of recruiting respondents (social networking sites, the three largest news portals in Latvia, embassies, diaspora organisations, diaspora media), interviews conducted in the summer-autumn of 2014.

Sample adjustment

Identical or very similar (comparable) questions were asked in both studies to people 15+.

I only include:

- those PGPE respondents who have Internet at home or use it at another place and
- those emigrants who:
 - have emigrated in 1991 or later, but no later than August 2014 – to capture participation in the new country of residence;
 - who live 100% abroad, or mostly abroad;
 - (in case of voting) are eligible to vote and are at least 22 years old, i.e., could have participated in the last, 2011 parliamentary elections.


The number of cases used in analysis:

- control group (PGPE, did not emigrate): 1095
- treatment group (survey of emigrants, emigrated): 10729

Where do Latvian emigrants live?

	Respondents		Latvian nationals abroad (official sources)	
	Count	%	Count	%
UK	4 954	35,2	70 502	33,3
Germany	1 476	10,5	20 820	9,8
Ireland	1 223	8,7	16 557	7,8
Norway	838	6	7 071	3,3
USA	810	5,8	28 272	13,4
Sweden	569	4	3 679	1,7
Denmark	471	3,3	3 621	1,7
The Netherland	399	2,8	2 699	1,3
Russia	370	2,6	8 851	4,2
Belgium	270	1,9	1 374	0,6
Canada	233	1,7	8 287	3,9
Finland	225	1,6	1 093	0,5
France	208	1,5	3 550	1,7
Austria	203	1,4	847	0,4
Spain	173	1,2	3 993	1,9
Italy	162	1,2	2 074	1
Australia	160	1,1	9 984	4,7
Switzerland	133	0,9	1 421	0,7
Estonia	107	0,8	2 436	1,2
Iceland	92	0,7	556	0,3
Cyprus	76	0,5	951	0,4
Luxembourg	70	0,5	436	0,2
Lithuania	60	0,4	941	0,4
Greece	58	0,4	351	0,2
Czech Republic	52	0,4	270	0,1
Other	676	4,7	1790	5,2


Age distribution




Participation rates of migrants and stayers




Participation rates of migrants and natives: protests




Participation rates of migrants and natives: voting




Participation rates of migrants and natives: petitions



Participation rates of migrants and natives: voluntary work



Participation rates of migrants and natives: membership in organisations



Selection of confounders

To satisfy the condition of conditional independence, the selection of confounders is especially important:

- In this case I include: age, gender, education, occupation, income (struggling financially), ethnicity, having more than one adult in HH, having children in HH, being married or having a partner, type of locality, trust in neighbourhood residents, institutional trust, following news regularly, satisfaction with life in general.

Initial PSM results: Protests, demonstrations and strikes LYP

```
. psmatch2 grupa, pscore(pscore) outcome(Aprotest) common neighbor(5)
```

Variable	Sample	Treated	Controls	Difference	S.E.	T-stat
Aprotest	Unmatched	.034512363	.021598272	.01291409	.006294777	2.05
	ATT	.034986474	.027989179	.006997295	.014981476	0.47

Note: S.E. does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated.

psmatch2: Treatment assignment	psmatch2: Common support		Total
	Off suppo	On suppor	
Untreated	0	926	926
Treated	279	5,545	5,824
Total	279	6,471	6,750

Balancing

	Bias prior to matching (%)	Bias after matching (%)
Gender	8,90	7,40
Age	1,80	2,80
Age2	1,10	1,30
Majority ethnic group	4,00	4,60
Secondary education	0,70	2,70
Tertiary education	-7,80	-10,40
Large city	-0,60	-3,30
Town	-13,10	-5,40
Rural	5,30	4,40
In education	11,50	4,60
Unemployed	6,50	2,70
Housework, looking after children or others	8,20	11,00
Pensioners	1,00	0,60
Other	-7,70	-4,90
HH struggling financially	-19,30	-9,90
More than one adult in HH	0,80	6,30
Children in HH	-1,20	1,70
Married or has a partner	9,10	8,30
Trust in the government	-2,20	-1,20
Social trust in neighbours	1,00	-0,50
Satisfaction with life in general	4,90	4,80
Regularly following news	6,50	6,30
Mean bias	5,60	4,78

Reducing bias

Summary of the distribution of |bias|

Percentiles		Smallest		
1%	.6034933	.6034933		
5%	.7231421	.7231421		
10%	.806925	.806925	Obs	22
25%	1.050715	.9776825	Sum of Wgt.	22
50%	5.060271		Mean	5.602634
		Largest	Std. Dev.	4.901181
75%	8.209427	9.100801		
90%	11.53759	11.53759	Variance	24.02157
95%	13.08467	13.08467	Skewness	1.037338
99%	19.32587	19.32587	Kurtosis	3.802935

Summary of the distribution of |bias|

Percentiles		Smallest		
1%	.4818697	.4818697		
5%	.6073567	.6073567		
10%	1.15992	1.15992	Obs	22
25%	2.654593	1.282908	Sum of Wgt.	22
50%	4.634356		Mean	4.779167
		Largest	Std. Dev.	3.135956
75%	6.335442	8.253839		
90%	9.931753	9.931753	Variance	9.834217
95%	10.35605	10.35605	Skewness	.5088253
99%	11.02487	11.02487	Kurtosis	2.327001

Final results: protests, demonstrations and strikes

```
. psmatch2 grupa, pscore(pscore) outcome(Aprotest) common caliper(0.01) neighbor(5)
```

Variable	Sample	Treated	Controls	Difference	S.E.	T-stat
Aprotest	Unmatched	.034512363	.021598272	.01291409	.006294777	2.05
	ATT	.034868296	.043774872	-.008906576	.014232921	-0.63

Note: S.E. does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated.

psmatch2: Treatment assignment	psmatch2: Common support		Total
	Off suppo	On suppor	
Untreated	0	926	926
Treated	547	5,277	5,824
Total	547	6,203	6,750

Final results: writing petitions and letters to public officials LYP

Tested algorithms	Method	Replace-ment	Mean bias (%)
	NN	No	10,25
	NN	Yes	9,30
	NN+caliper=0.001	Yes	6,82
	NN+caliper=0.01	Yes	9,31
	5-n+caliper=0.01	Yes	5,57
	Kernel		6,10
	Radius + caliper (0.01)		5,97

```
. psmatch2 grupa, pscore(pscore) outcome(Apetition) common caliper(0.01) neighbor(5)
```

Variable	Sample	Treated	Controls	Difference	S.E.	T-stat
Apetition	Unmatched	.094018563	.076756757	.017261806	.010212578	1.69
	ATT	.094100615	.133659066	-.039558451	.029424637	-1.34

Note: S.E. does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated.

psmatch2: Treatment assignment	psmatch2: Common support		Total
	Off suppo	On suppor	
Untreated	0	925	925
Treated	292	5,526	5,818
Total	292	6,451	6,743

Final results: voting in the last Latvian parliamentary elections


```
. psmatch2 grupa, pscore(pscore) outcome(Avote) common radius caliper(0.01)
```

Variable	Sample	Treated	Controls	Difference	S.E.	T-stat
Avote	Unmatched	.32014809	.825613079	-.505464989	.018019313	-28.05
	ATT	.320350952	.75653954	-.436188588	.037663424	-11.58

Note: S.E. does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated.

psmatch2: Treatment assignment	psmatch2: Common support		Total
	Off suppo	On suppor	
Untreated	0	734	734
Treated	459	4,673	5,132
Total	459	5,407	5,866

ATT difference by time



Final results: voluntary work LYP


```
. psmatch2 grupa, pscore(pscore) outcome(Avolwork) common kernel
```

Variable	Sample	Treated	Controls	Difference	S.E.	T-stat
Avolwork	Unmatched	.223429952	.182548794	.040881157	.015000678	2.73
	ATT	.2197053	.187547185	.032158115	.027668402	1.16

Note: S.E. does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated.

psmatch2: Treatment assignment	psmatch2: Common support		Total
	Off suppo	On suppor	
Untreated	0	871	871
Treated	1,249	4,547	5,796
Total	1,249	5,418	6,667

ATT difference by time



Final results: donating LYP

```
. psmatch2 grupa, pscore(pscore) outcome(Adonate) common radius caliper(0.01)
```

Variable	Sample	Treated	Controls	Difference	S.E.	T-stat
Adonate	Unmatched	.48631905	.461625282	.024693768	.018022798	1.37
	ATT	.481811146	.499761348	-.017950202	.047734045	-0.38

Note: S.E. does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated.

psmatch2: Treatment assignment	psmatch2: Common support		Total
	Off suppo	On suppor	
Untreated	0	886	886
Treated	643	5,168	5,811
Total	643	6,054	6,697

Final results: membership in organisations


```
. psmatch2 grupa, pscore(pscore) outcome(Amember) common caliper(0.01) neighbor(5)
```

Variable	Sample	Treated	Controls	Difference	S.E.	T-stat
Amember	Unmatched	.344498438	.215005599	.129492839	.016800403	7.71
	ATT	.342666419	.2640089	.078657519	.043238333	1.82

Note: S.E. does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated.

psmatch2: Treatment assignment	psmatch2: Common support		Total
	Off suppo	On suppor	
Untreated	0	893	893
Treated	369	5,393	5,762
Total	369	6,286	6,655

ATT difference by time



Conclusions

- Moving to an other country results in a **sharp decline in voting** – minus 44 per cent among emigrants (treated) compared to those who did not emigrate (control), and the gap increases over time;
- Migrants participate in protest activities abroad as much as stayers, but there is a large gap with the natives (except for Belgium and Luxembourg) that tends to remain;
- Emigrants more than stayers (and less than natives) write petitions and letters to officials, however, migration has no effect on that;
- Overall, emigration reduces electoral participation, but **does not affect participation in other political activities**. The differences with stayers and natives are mainly due to selection effect or contextual differences.

Conclusions

- Overall, immigrants in most receiving countries are more likely than stayers (but less likely than natives) to be members of organisations or associations. **Migration increases membership in organisations and associations** by 8 percent, as migrants who arrived up to 2008 start catching up with the general population (ie., after 5 years abroad).
- Emigration has no effect on engagement in voluntary work. The gap with natives in terms of voluntary work differs from country to country.
- Emigration does not hinder donating.

Next steps

- The question “**Why?**”
- It is possible that the some effects **cancel each other out**.
- Next: **Multilevel analysis** of factors explaining differences in social and political participation of Latvian migrants in their new countries of residence: individual and **contextual factors** (opportunity structures, integration policies, socio-economic context).

The extent of activism depends on the conditions of the society in which they live, on the opportunities that this society offers for participation (Koopmans 2004).

Thank you!

Questions or comments?

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Is there a need for matching?

	Control group	Treated
A man	47.9	26.7
Latvian	69.8	89.7
ISCED<3	25.4	11.4
ISCED3	27.5	24.3
ISCED4	17.3	16.8
ISCED 5+	29.9	47.6
Age	24	25
Capital city	39.8	22.2
Other large city	15.8	38.7
Town	18.7	31.7
Rural area	25.7	7.4
Employed	48.2	66.3
In education	29.9	15.6
Unemployed	5.3	3.6
Housework, looking after children or others	12.0	11.1
Other	4.6	3.4
Household struggling financially	41.3	12.1